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1. Introduction
The Republic of Korea, actually South Korea, has been considered as an economic powerhouse. It 
is also one of the Four Tigers in the East Asian region and has attained much attention for two main 
reasons: firstly, its miraculous economic progress achieved within a quick span of time compared 
to other East Asian countries; and secondly, it is a country with a smooth path of exceptionally 
demonstrated strong recovery from the financial turmoil that has shaken the whole region to a great 
extent. The average gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of South Korea between 1970 and 
1997 was 8.4 per cent (Shim and Lee, 2008); and accordingly by 1995 it was regarded as ‘developed 
nation’ with real GDP growth rate between 7 and 9 per cent per year and per capital income of US$ 
10,000 compared to 2.3 per cent and less than US$ 100 respectively in 1960 (Jwa, 2001). South 
Korea faced a financial crisis in 1997 along with other South Asian countries, which has brought its 
way of development under question for a while. However, researchers like Bhagwati (1998), Furman 
and Stiglitz (1998), and Krugman (1999) opine that the crisis is the outcome of international financial 
liberalization and extensive flow of international capital rather than South Korea’s faulty way of 
economic development process. Moreover, inappropriate policy prescriptions given by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) provides fuel to the crisis. Afterwards, South Korea has attained a sharp recovery 
from financial crisis, which can be regarded as ‘V recovery’, instead of accomplishing a stagnant growth 
period for at least three to four years as anticipated (Shin, 2004). Therefore, the case of South Korean 
recovery from financial crisis makes it more interesting for researchers to investigate the contributing 
factor towards its outstanding recovery.
Japan has been considered another economic miracle of World War II era for its remarkable economic 
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progress, especially after World War II. The economy of Japan can be categorized as high growth period 
followed by moderate growth period until bubbling of the bubble economy and period of prolonged 
economic and financial stagnation since the bursting of the bubble and corresponding financial crisis. 
During the high growth period Japan relied on the ‘catching up’ strategy of absorbing and improving 
engineering know-how absorbed from abroad, which contributed a lot towards its development process. 
In the moderate growth period, many Japanese industries reached the international technology and 
marketing frontier and thereby exposed to high levels of fundamental uncertainty in terms of business 
and investment. By the end of this period, Japan had become what we can describe as a ‘frontier 
economy’ in terms of technology. In parallel, it started to accommodate a paradigm shift in its industrial 
structure from primary to secondary industry and very recently to tertiary, i.e., service industry. 
The change in industrial structure along with the change in technological adoption requires for an 
effective functioning of the financial market through prudential screening and monitoring of financial 
intermediation from lenders and investors. However, in reality Japan observed the accumulation of a 
huge volume of non-performing loan (NPL) in the Japanese banks after the bursting of the financial 
bubble, which represented malfunctioning of its traditional mode of monitoring that was effective 
during its high growth period.          
It appears that South Korea has been experiencing similar change in its industrial structure with 
the similar shift to frontier economy from a catching up strategy. How does this transition in South 
Korea affect its banking and economic system? Apparently, still it recovers from financial crisis and 
continues its moderate economic growth with immense success, whereas Japan fails to do so. What 
factors contributed to South Korea’s strong recovery from crisis? What went wrong in Japan? Is there 
any lesson that South Korea can learn from Japan so that it can make its development sustainable? This 
paper aims at identifying the reasons that contributed to South Korean strong recovery from financial 
crisis by evaluating industrial structure change and banks’ response towards the change. It will also 
assess Japan’s transition failure by reviewing the collapse of its monitoring system under the changing 
scenarios and thereby produce the lessons that South Korea can learn from Japan’s experiences to make 
its recovered economy sustainable.         
The contribution of this paper is threefold. Firstly, it adopts a new way of analyzing the South Korean 
recovery by focusing on the industrial structure change in South Korea compared to Japan. Secondly, 
the findings generated by the study are useful in formulating policies so that the recovered South 
Korean economy can be sustainable in the long-run. Thirdly, the findings of this study also provide some 
guidelines for further research.  
The later part of this paper is organized as follows: Section two generates a comparison between 
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South Korea and Japan by comparing respective countries’ industrial structure change and GDP growth. 
Section three elaborates the background of the collapse of Japanese successful monitoring system under 
the transition to frontier economy. Section four evaluates the financing pattern of the South Korean 
financial intermediaries in line with transition in industrial and economic structural change. Section five 
concludes by addressing some lessons that South Korea can learn for ensuring sustainable economic 
growth and by creating some opportunities for further research.       
2. Comparison between South Korea and Japan in respect to Structural Change
South Korea has moved to export-led industrialization policy backed by strong leadership of the 
President Park Chung-hee in 1961 from import substitution policy, which was promulgated in the 
1950s. This shift laid down the foundation of massive economic progress of South Korea (Song, 1990; 
Lee, 1996; and Smith, 2000). Export-led policy was accompanied by labor intensive industries with a 
view to accommodating well-educated and abundant work force, state controlled and directed credit 
policy through assuring central bank autonomy and nationalization of commercial banks, and exchange 
rate reform from a unitary floating rate to a crawling peg system (Jwa, 2001). Later on during 1970s, 
the focus of industrialization was posted to capital-intensiveness particularly in the field of heavy and 
chemical industry (HCI). During these periods large corporations, commonly known as chaebols 1）, were 
allowed to enter into designated and protected industries. These large corporations were permitted 
to diversify their operations in areas directed by industrial policy and patronized by financial benefits 
(ibid.), although the concentration of chaebols was predominantly noticeable in the manufacturing sector 
(Shim and Lee, 2008). Both the two labor and capital intensive industrializations led to high economic 
growth until 1990, except in 1980 and in 1997 (figure 1). The socio-political unrest, the assassination 
of President Park Chung Hee in October 1979, the subsequent re-establishment of military rule in May 
1980, the worst harvest since 1962, and the second global oil price hike collectively resulted into the 
decline in GDP in 1980 (Harvie and Lee, 2003). The growth rate of GDP was again badly affected by the 
East Asian financial crisis in 1997. In this regard, Harvie and Lee (2002) classify South Korean economy 
until the financial crisis into two segments: period of economic miracle from 1962 to 1989 and period 
of fading of the miracle from 1990 to 1997. Later, South Korea has started to recover from the financial 
crisis and the development process can be considered as moderate growth period compared to the high 
growth period as reflected in figure 1.  
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Figure 1: GDP Growth Rates over the Years in South Korea and Japan
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Japan represents the first mover in the industrialization process among Asian countries (Memedovic 
and Lelio apadre, 2009) that resulted into high economic growth. According to table 1, the average 
real GDP growth rates during the high growth period (1966-1974) was 8.82 per cent per year. High 
growth period of Japan was associated with the adoption of catching-up strategy with the US economy. 
It was very successful in absorbing and improving engineering know-how absorbed from abroad and 
accordingly contributed immensely towards the high growth of Japan. From the mid-1970s, Japan 
rapidly changed its industrial structure by moving from low-skilled to more sophisticated production 
process. That is, the importance of agriculture sector gradually declined whereas the growth of non-
agricultural sector, initially the manufacturing sector including large manufacturing firms and very 
lately the service sector, has been patronized. Researchers like Aoki et al. 1994; Schaberg, 1998; Patrick, 
1998; Kanaya and Woo, 2000; and Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001 observe empirical evidence in favor of 
the internationalization and technological change in the production process of Japanese firms since 
the mid-1970s. This period of economic progress can be defined as the moderate growth period with 
an annual real GDP growth rates of 4.05 per cent per annum (table 1) and with a sharp increase of the 
share of tertiary industry and a decline of the primary industry (table 2, see also Suzuki, 2011). It comes 
to an end when Japan was experiencing a financial bubble and corresponding bubble burst. After that 
starting from 1992, the Japanese economy has been oscillated by a prolonged economic and financial 
slump with a further drop of the share of primary industry and a radical increase of the share of tertiary 
industry (table 2).         
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Table 1: Japan’s Average Real GDP Growth Rates (at constant prices)
1966-1974a 1975-1991a 1992-2008b
8.82% p.a. 4.05% p.a. 1.20% p.a.
Source: Authors based on statistics of Cabinet Office and ESRI (2008). aBase year = 1990, bbase year = 2000.   
Table 2: The Changes of the Share of each Industry in Japan’s GDP (at current prices)
Sector 1966-1974a 1975-1991a 1992-2008b
Primary 7.5% 3.8% 1.8%
Secondary
         Manufacturing
40.7%
33.5%
36.7%
27.9%
28.5%
21.3%
Tertiary 51.8% 59.5% 69.6%
Source: Authors based on statistics of Cabinet Officea and ESRI (2008)b
South Korea has also been experiencing structural change in its industrial composition as it moves to 
more sophisticated production process. Table 3 represents the value addition in percentage by different 
types of industries to GDP. It reflects that the share of primary industry has been reducing over time 
whereas the share of tertiary industry has been increasing. In 1965, the share of primary industry was 
39 per cent, which reduced to only 3 percent in 2009. On the other hand, the share of tertiary industry 
increased to 61 percent in 2009 from 39 percent in 1965. The sharp contrast between South Korea 
and Japan is the contribution of secondary industry. In South Korea it has been in an increasing trend 
whereas in Japan it has been in the opposite direction. The reason for the increase in manufacturing 
sector in South Korea may as a result of the large firms still hold some competitive edge in the 
international market along with the shift to tertiary industry. It can be argued that the underlying fact 
behind South Korea’s strong recovery from financial crisis is due partly to its continuing reliance on the 
secondary industry including the manufacturing sector.   
Table 3: Value Added to GDP (in per cent) by Different Types of Industries in South Korea
Sector 1965 1970 1980 1990 1997 2000 2009
Primary 39 29 16 9 5 5 3
Secondary 21 26 37 42 41 38 36
        Manufacturing 14 18 24 27 26 28 28
Tertiary 39 45 47 49 53 57 61
Source: World Bank, 2011
3. What went wrong in Japan after the High Growth Period?
This section will examine how the Japanese traditional monitoring system, which worked so well 
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until the high growth period became ineffective through a paradigm shift from catching-up to frontier 
economy. The analysis is going to be done by focusing on Japanese banks’ financial pattern in line with 
the shift in industrial composition in Japan. 
It has already been observed that the decline of primary and secondary industry including the 
manufacturing sector and the rise of tertiary industry have been continuing in Japan from catching-
up to frontier economy. Table 4 indicates that the financing to manufacturing sector was dominant 
until 1970 and after that it started to decline tremendously. This change reflects the structural change 
in Japan in its industrial composition. However, Japanese banks have expanded their overall business 
since 1970s and accordingly the outstanding loan to the manufacturing sector has been increasing even 
though the share of loan to manufacturing sector has been decreasing.      
Table 4: Changes in the Outstanding Loans by the Japanese Banks to Industries (in trillion yen)
In levels FY1960 FY1970 FY1980 FY1990 FY1995 FY2000 FY2008
Manufacturing
Construction
Real Estate
Finance
Wholesale & Retail
Loans to Individuals
Others
4.0
0.2
0.1
0.1
2.3
0.0
1.4
17.5
1.8
1.5
0.5
11.3
1.6
5.0
43.0
7.3
7.6
4.5
34.4
15.2
22.6
59.0
20.0
42.4
37.7
65.6
61.2
90.1
72.6
31.1
57.4
49.6
78.1
80.9
114.8
67.1
28.8
57.0
39.7
65.8
92.7
107.2
56.4
15.4
58.7
36.9
45.9
112.1
96.1
Total 8.1 39.2 134.6 376.0 484.5 458.3 421.5
In percentage terms
Manufacturing
Construction
Real Estate
Finance
Wholesale & Retail
Loans to Individuals
Others
49.4
2.5
1.2
1.2
28.4
0.0
17.3
44.6
4.6
3.8
1.3
28.8
4.1
12.8
31.9
5.4
5.6
3.3
25.6
11.3
16.8
15.7
5.3
11.3
10.0
17.4
16.3
24.0
15.0
6.4
11.8
10.2
16.1
16.7
23.7
14.6
6.3
12.4
8.7
14.4
20.2
23.4
13.4
3.6
13.9
8.8
10.9
26.6
22.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Created by the Authors upon Bank of Japan (BOJ) (1960, 1970, 1975, 1980), Japan Statistical Year Book 2010.
Table 5 gives an overview of the composition of the fund raising by the Japanese manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing sectors. It shows that the manufacturing sector started to use internal source 
for financing to a greater extent after the high-growth period. According to Hamazaki and Horiuchi 
(2001), most of the Japanese manufacturing firms drastically reduced their dependency on bank loan 
as it has reduced to less than 10 per cent from more than 30 per cent in the late-1970s. This is because 
these firms became financially matured after the high growth period. Thus, Japanese banks started to 
undertake higher credit risks through financing to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) whose financial 
strength was relatively weak. Apparently, the SME manufacturing firms still relied on banks to a greater 
extent, because they were not financially matured and needed to invest in restructuring their business 
to highly sophisticated manufacturing process to cope with stiff competition or shifting their production 
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base to overseas to reduce production cost. At the same time Japanese banks started to undertake more 
credit risks of non-manufacturing firms, which overlap with the SMEs to a considerable extent (Tanaka, 
2002). While starting to undertake higher credit risks, the return of assets (ROA) of Japanese banks 
started to decline from 1970 (figure 2). This shows that the Japanese banks had started to undertake 
the unfamiliar risk for them without changing the traditional mode of screening and pricing, in spite 
that a different mode was necessary for the loan exposure towards the SMEs.  
Table 5: Changes in the Composition of Fund Raising by the Japanese Major Manufacturing /
 Non-manufacturing Firms (in percentage)
Type of Firms Sources of Funds FY
1961
-1965
FY
1966
-1970
FY
1971
-1975
FY
1976
-1980
FY
1981
-1985
FY
1986
-1990
Manufacturing Internal Funds
Corporate Bonds
Borrowing
Stocks
Others
27.1
2.8
38.2
10.8
21.1
33.7
3.0
30.4
3.2
29.7
35.9
3.9
34.0
2.4
23.7
54.3
1.0
9.5
7.8
27.4
68.0
10.3
1.2
12.8
7.7
53.9
19.9
-9.5
19.1
16.7
Non-
Manufacturing
Internal Funds
Corporate Bonds
Borrowing
Stocks
Others
22.7
12.3
32.7
7.9
24.3
46.3
10.3
65.9
6.8
-29.3
29.6
12.9
59.0
7.0
-8.5
44.9
19.3
39.1
8.5
-11.7
51.8
10.8
26.1
9.5
1.8
35.8
14.1
29.1
11.5
9.5
Source: Based on Hamazaki and Horiuchi (2001)
Notes: The major part of ‘others’ in the table is the trade credit. According to Hamazaki and Horiuchi (2001), the non-
manufacturing industry includes public utilities such as the electric power and the railway companies, which were 
favored in their bond issuing compared with other industries. Therefore, the relative share of bond-issuing was larger 
in non-manufacturing than in manufacturing.
Figure 2: ROA in Japanese banks
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It is worth noting that, though all types of manufacturing firms were successful during the high 
growth period with concentration of catching up strategy, there are ‘winners’ and ‘losers’  in the frontier 
economy period. This is because as the economy moved to frontier, firms were required to restructure 
its business under huge amount of fundamental uncertainty. Table 6 portrays the average real growth 
rate by different categories of manufacturing firms.        
Table 6: Changes in the Average Real Growth Rate by each type of Manufacturing (in percentage)
Manufacturing Sector 1956
-1974a
(High 
Growth)
1975
-1984a
(Moderate
Growth)
1985
-1991a
1992
-2008b
Overall manufacturing sector
Light industry upon assembling & 
processing
    Food and beverages
    Textiles
    Other manufacturing
Light industry upon basic materials
    Pulp, paper and paper products
    Non-metallic mineral products
Heavy industry upon basic materials
    Chemicals 
    Petroleum and coal products
    Basic metal
    Fabricated metal products
Heavy industry upon assembling & 
processing
    Machinery
    Electrical machinery and equipment
    Transport equipment
    Precision instrument
17.0
13.5
 10.4
 12.2
 18.0
18.2
 18.0
 18.5
18.4
 16.0
 15.9
 21.8
 21.6
21.7
 22.6
 23.1
 21.2
 18.5
7.1
7.2
 10.4
 1.1
 6.8
4.2
 3.9
 4.5
6.2
 7.5
 26.7
 4.7
 3.4
8.5
 8.8
 11.6
 5.8
 6.3
5.4
4.5
 2.6
 -0.1
 6.6
5.0
 5.7
 4.5
5.3
 4.8
 3.8
 3.7
 10.2
6.3
 8.0
 6.6
 3.9
 5.8
-1.7
-1.9
 -0.2
 -7.5
 -2.8
-1.9
 -2.0
 -1.9
-1.3
 -2.4
 2.8
 -1.3
 -3.2
-1.0
 -1.3
 -1.7
 1.0
 -1.4
Source: Authors based on statistics of Cabinet Officea and ESRI (2008)b
It can be argued that banks’ monitoring of borrowers was not so difficult during the high growth stage 
of Japan since the efforts of almost all of firms were likely to be rewarded leading to success. With the 
shift to frontier economy from catching-up, competition was intensified and fundamental uncertainty 
came into action; which collectively resulted into the environmental and economic changes surrounding 
the traditional monitoring system. As Aoki (1994) points out, the Japanese traditional monitoring 
system worked as long as Japanese economy was governed by the catching-up in terms of technological 
capability. The traditional mode of screening and monitoring should have been overhauled or 
replaced with a different mode of responding to intensified uncertainties. We should also note that the 
overwhelming presence of the public sector in housing loans, which is one of the major profit centers 
for US and European banks, made it difficult for Japanese banks to diversity their profit structure (Suzuki, 
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2011). The ratio of real estate loans (those on residential properties) to total loans in the US reached 
almost 25 per cent while that in Japan remained at around 15 per cent in 1999 (Bank of Japan, 2001). 
The conventional housing loans to prime borrowers brought high profits to banks and their exposures 
were secured by mortgages on residential properties. Presumably, the reduction of the presence of 
public financial institutions in housing loans in Japan would have contributed to an enhancement of the 
profit base of Japanese banks. 
4. Financing Pattern in South Korean Economy 
Table 7 represents the industry wise outstanding loan in billion won and also in percentage of total 
industry loan in South Korea during the period 1998-2009. The primary industry includes agriculture, 
forestry, and fishing; the secondary industry includes mining  and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, 
gas, steam, & water supply, and construction; and all others, namely sewerage, waste management, 
materials recovery  and remediation, wholesale and retail trade, transportation, accommodation and 
food service, information and communications, financial and insurance, real estate, renting  and leasing, 
professional, scientific & technical activities, business facilities management and business support, 
education, human health and social work, public administration, and other activities are included in 
the tertiary industry. According to the table, the financing to the primary sector has been reducing 
whereas the loan to tertiary industry has been increasing, which are in line with the structural change in 
South Korea. However, the financing to the manufacturing sector in percentage term has been reducing 
although in figure it has been in an increasing trend.      
Table 7: Outstanding Loan in Amount (in billion Won) and in Percentage of All Industry Loan in Different 
Industries in South Korea
Sector 1998 2000 2003 2006 2009
Primary 19,619.10 21,640.00 17,312.30 14,462.20 15,053.40
Secondary 85,084.30 105,227.60 133,196.30 163,195.50 247,834.20
        Manufacturing 69,200.60 87,801.10 105,590.70 127,470.80 196,556.70
Tertiary 40,063.90 74.991.50 133,995.60 175,550.30 281,113.60
In Percentage
Sector 1998 2000 2003 2006 2009
Primary 13.55 10.72 6.09 4.09 2.77
Secondary 58.77 52.13 46.82 46.20 45.56
Manufacturing 47.80 43.50 37.11 36.09 36.13
Tertiary 27.67 37.15 47.10 49.70 51.68
Source: The Bank of Korea
The above table gives an indication about the change in the lending pattern of commercial banks 
in South Korea. Korean banks started to focus on lending to other sectors after the financial crisis by 
reducing their exposure to large firms in the manufacturing sector. According to Akama et al. (2003), 
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the financial restructuring program in South Korea brought dramatic transformation in the financing 
and corporate governance patterns of banks, which have reduced the lending to chaebols and increased 
the lending to households and SMEs, particularly in the service sector. Shin (2004) also reports sharp 
decline in indirect financing in South Korea after the financial crisis. The change in the government-
chaebol relationship after the crisis also resulted into the decline in bank lending. Before the crisis the 
government favored the chaebols, whereas after the crisis only winners received all benefits expected 
from the government and losers received nothing (Lee, 1999; cited in Shim and Lee, 2008), i.e., chaebols 
seemingly received less benefit from the government after the crisis. According to Woo (1991) cited in 
Lee (2008), highly preferential treatment was offered to chaebols during the high growth period. On the 
other hand, Shim and Lee (2008) opine that negative public opinion and unfavorable economic situation 
created by the crisis led to an increasing government control with regard to chaebols’ business. Figure 
3 represents long term debt to banking institutions by large manufacturing firms and SMEs during 
the period 1990-2010. It reflects that in 1990 the long term debt to banking institutions by large 
manufacturing firms was 3.04 times higher than that by SMEs, whereas in 2010 SMEs surpass large 
firms with a 2.05 times higher long term debt. In response, chaebols have started to rely more on capital 
markets for financing and use stock, bonds, and commercial papers for fund raising (Akama et al. 2003). 
Figure 3: Long Tem Debt to Banking Institutions by Large Manufacturing Enterprises and SMEs
0
20,000,000
40,000,000
60,000,000
80,000,000
Large Manufacturing Enterprises SMEs
Source: The Bank of Korea
A salient feature of the breakdown of Korean household holdings, the same as that of Japanese ones, 
is that most holdings are "safety assets" such as currency and deposits, while the weight of "risk assets" 
such as shares, equities, and securities was small. According to Ko (2008), the weight of safety assets 
stayed at 61.9 per cent in 2001 and 60.3 per cent in 2003, respectively. This weight was higher than 
that held by the Japanese household sector. Presumably, Korean banks still need to transform the 
savings of risk-averse Korean households into long-term investments. However, Korean banks have 
been encouraged to reduce lending to the chaebols or the top 20 blue-chip companies which are still 
the major promoters of long-term investments, although large enterprises dominate the SMEs both 
before and after the financial crisis in terms of the monthly growths in sales, exports, production, and 
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profitability; as it is depicted in figures 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
Figure 4: Sales Growth of Large Enterprises and SMEs
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Figure 5: Exports Growth of Large Enterprises and SMEs
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Figure 6: Production Growth of Large Enterprises and SMEs
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Figure 7: Profitability Growth of Large Enterprises and SMEs
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The Korean Government responded to the 1997 crisis by injecting fiscal funds, equivalent to not less 
than 30 per cent of GDP, including capital injections, non-performing loan purchases, and depositor 
protections (Akama et al. 2003). The government also actively invited foreign capital to recapitalize 
banks and strengthen banks' performance (ibid.). Figure 8 represents the change in purchases of shares 
(in million Won) by foreign investors during the period 1992-2010. It reports that the shareholding 
is 123.83 times higher in 2010 compared to that of 1992. Thus, many Korean banks are probably 
still being closely monitored by the government or the foreign owners so that Korean banks may not 
concentrate their loan portfolio exposure to the particular chaebols, which concentrated portfolio might 
have caused the financial turmoil leading to the economic disaster.
 
Figure 8: Purchases of Shares by Foreigners during 1992-2010 
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So far, the chaebols or the top 20 blue-chips could tap on the corporate bond market to raise the 
necessary funds. Many foreign investors have shown an interest in investing in Korean blue chips 
(including Korean banks). However, we should note that, according to Ko (2008), the corporate bond 
market can afford to buy only the middle-term bonds issued by Korean firms with the final maturity of 
the range of 2 to 3 years at the maximum. To what extent can Korea continue to ask foreign investors 
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to take over the role of long-term intermediaries for channeling household savings into long-term 
investment in Korean economy? Even their middle-term commitment to solving the hidden structural 
problems in financial intermediation in South Korea cannot be relied on to any great extent.
5. Conclusion
South Korea and Japan have been considered as remarkable achievers of economic growth in the 
world in general and East Asian region in particular. The former has attained economic progress within 
a very short of period of time followed by a financial crisis and afterwards speedy recovery from the 
crisis. On the other hand, although Japan’s development after the World War II was also outstanding 
indeed, its prolonged financial and economic stagnation started from the bursting of bubble and 
corresponding crisis is yet to be resolved. In line with this, this paper is undertaken to identify the 
reasons that contributed to South Korea’s recovery by evaluating its industrial structure change and 
banks’ response towards the change. It reveals that both Japan and South Korea have experienced a 
paradigm shift in their industrial structure by shifting the focus from primary to secondary industry 
and then to tertiary industry through their development process. However, the sharp contrast between 
these two countries is that the secondary industry, predominantly the manufacturing industry, still 
contributes a lot towards GDP in South Korea. This is possibly one of the fundamental reasons for the 
South Korean prompt recovery from the crisis. Seemingly, large manufacturing firms in South Korea still 
maintain a certain competitive edge in the international market even after the crisis, whereas in Japan 
manufacturing firms have already lost their traditional competitive edge leading to a higher focus in 
knowledge-based values added and an earlier response to a frontier economy paradigm shifted from the 
catching up period.                    
This paper also aims at producing some lessons for South Korea to ensure a sustainable economic 
growth by reviewing the collapse of the traditional monitoring system in Japan under the changing 
scenarios. The Japanese mode of screening and monitoring was effective during the high growth period 
when most of the manufacturing firms were successful and accordingly, became financially matured and 
started to rely less on banks. In return, banks increased the loan exposure to non-manufacturing firms 
and SMEs, which generally carries higher credit risks. The fundamental uncertainty brought by frontier 
economy and the change in loan portfolio selection of Japanese banks collectively resulted into a serious 
problem in financial intermediation causing an ongoing financial and economic stagnation. On the other 
hand, under a political pressure, South Korean banks were encouraged to decrease their lending to large 
manufacturing firms after the financial crisis in spite that large firms are still expected to play the role 
as the engine for Korean economic recovery. At this point in time, Korean large firms use capital markets 
for financing mainly from foreign investors. But how long large firms can rely on foreign investors is 
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really a difficult question to answer. Any financial turmoil in the capital market will make the situation 
even more difficult for the large firms in particular and the overall economy in general, since Korean 
banks still need to transform the savings of risk-averse Korean households into long-term investments 
by large firms. If Korean banks fail to play the role as prudent financial intermediaries at that moment, 
Korean economy may possibly fall into the same dilemma of financial intermediation which resulted in 
the Japanese economy being trapped into a deep and prolonged financial slump.       
This paper does not focus on elaborate analysis of the changing pattern in the corporate financing 
strategies of large manufacturing firms in response to the restructuring process after financial crisis. 
Further investigation on this issue will provide a clear picture about the entire scenario. Moreover, the 
increasing credit risk associated with SME financing is an important issue to be dealt with through 
further research. 
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注
１） 　 Chaebol can be defined as large business group that run and owned by family and relatives and involved in 
diversified business field.   
【2011 年 12 月 9 日 レフェリーの審査を経て掲載決定】
